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For Better or for Worse? Job and
Earnings Mobility in Nine Middle- and
Low-Income Countries
Recent evidence suggests that most market economies show significantdynamism. Many firms are created and destroyed every year, and surviv-
ing firms undergo a continuous process of transformation.1 As a result, a
substantial number of jobs are created and destroyed, and an even larger num-
ber of workers change status in the labor market, moving across jobs, from
employment to unemployment and back to employment, and also entering and
exiting the labor market.2 Large, if not even larger, rates of mobility are also
observed in developing countries.3
As noted by Haltiwanger and others, one of the most controversial debates
on institutional design and economic policy has been sparked around the trade-
offs associated with labor mobility.4 On the one hand, mobility may promote
efficiency and growth if economic forces induce the reallocation of resources
toward the most productive uses. On the other hand, high mobility may imply
that workers are uncertain and have concerns about income security. 
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1. Caves (1998); Bartelsman and Doms (2000); for surveys, see Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and
Scarpetta (2004). 
2. See, for example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). 
3. See IADB (2003); Rutkowski and Scarpetta (2005); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta
(2004). 
4. Haltiwanger and others (2004). 
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Such trade-offs between economic efficiency and job stability become par-
ticularly important in the context of middle- and low-income countries where
limited safety nets do not insulate workers against economic risk. In the last
fifteen years, many of these countries have seen rapid economic transforma-
tion led by structural reforms and trade integration. For example, in Latin
America, trade as a percentage of GDP increased from 27 percent in 1995 to
44 percent in 2004, while in the same period in the transition economies (here
defined as former socialist countries), it increased from 45 to 70 percent.5 While
such reforms have brought productivity gains, they have also increased labor
reallocation.6 Analyzing the welfare costs of such reforms is beyond the scope
of this study. More modestly, we assess the nature of labor mobility in a sam-
ple of countries that underwent important—albeit different—structural reforms
over the past decade that had significant impact on the magnitude and charac-
teristics of labor mobility. This is an important first step to understanding the
welfare effects of such reforms. 
This article summarizes the findings of an ongoing study examining worker
flows and, when possible, the associated earnings changes associated with such
flows across different statuses in the labor market and across different types
of jobs. The study focuses on three countries in Latin America and six transi-
tion economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although the
selection of countries is driven by the existence of longitudinal data, essential
for a study of worker mobility, this selection of countries has the bonus of
spanning low- and middle-income economies, as well as transition and devel-
oping countries. 
We address a number of questions. Central to the question of the nature of
labor mobility is assessing to what extent workers transit quickly across jobs
or become stuck in long periods of unemployment. Another central issue is to
what extent mobility implies welfare gains or losses relative to those workers
who did not change their status in the labor market. A third question, much dis-
cussed in the development literature, is to what extent workers in low- and
middle-income countries experience barriers to entry into good (that is, “for-
mal”) jobs and thus become trapped in low-productivity and low-paying jobs.
So far, few studies have directly examined mobility in low- and middle-income
economies. Even fewer studies have examined mobility between different types
of jobs.7 In this study we define different types of jobs on the basis of whether
188 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
5. World Bank (2006).
6. For discussion of reforms and productivity gains, see Fernandes (2002); Pavcnik (2002);
Eslava and others (2005). For discussion of reforms and labor reallocation, see Haltiwanger and
others (2004); Eslava and others (2005). 
7. See, for example, Maloney (1999); Gong, van Soest, and Villagomez (2004); IADB (2003). 
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they are salaried or not and whether workers have access to social security ben-
efits, which we use as a proxy for whether such jobs are in compliance with
the country’s laws. To the extent possible we define common, harmonized cat-
egories to allow for cross-country comparisons. 
The picture that emerges from our analysis is quite complex. There is a high
degree of mobility in the labor market of all countries examined. Many work-
ers move across jobs directly, while many others move in and out of the labor
market and between jobs and unemployment. For most countries we do not
find evidence of workers being trapped in unemployment for a long period,
partly because of limited income-support schemes for the unemployed, which
force workers to find a job quickly. We find large flows in and out of the labor
market, however. Moreover, we find that mobility has important earnings con-
sequences: positive for workers who move from informal salaried jobs to
self-employment and negative for workers who move from formal to informal
salaried jobs. However, individual heterogeneity and selection processes have
a large role in shaping the earnings consequences of mobility.
Data 
We focus our empirical analysis on six countries from eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union (Albania, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and
Ukraine) and on three Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico, and
Venezuela).8 Although measurement problems and attrition bias are always
potential issues in all studies based on longitudinal data, they do not seem to
be more problematic in our selected group of countries than they are in the
developed countries. We analyze transitions across one-year periods, because
this periodicity is commonly available, with the exception of Georgia, where
the longest time period between interviews is nine months. When more than
two records of individual data are available for a country, an individual can, in
theory, contribute multiple transitions, but we only consider the first transition
per person in the analysis. 
In our analysis, we consider six different statuses in the labor market: out
of labor force, unemployed, formal wage employees, informal wage employ-
ees, self-employed, and farmers. Individuals not belonging to any of these
categories (for example, employers or cooperative members) are excluded,
because the number of observations for these two categories of owners of firms
Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta 189
8. See Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta (2006) for a full description of the data used in
this study. 
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is not sufficient to perform a sensible dynamic analysis. Individuals are clas-
sified as out of the labor force when they did not work during the reference
week and did not look for a job during the reference period.  Unemployed are
those who did not work in the reference week but had searched for a job. For-
mal wage employees are those who receive a salary as well as social security
benefits (in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Albania). In some cases, when
information about social security is not available, formality is defined on the
base of whether there is a written (or registered) contract (in Georgia, Ukraine),
whether the firm is registered (in Hungary, Russia), or whether the contract is
open ended (in Poland). Salaried workers who do not fall into these categories
are considered informal. Self-employed are those who report to themselves (that
is, business owners without employees). Following conventional definitions
used by the ILO, we exclude self-employed persons engaged in professional
activities, such as lawyers or doctors, from this category and hence from the
sample. The self-employed are split into workers in agricultural activities (farm-
ers) and workers in nonagricultural activities.
The nine countries examined are heterogeneous and have experienced dif-
ferent economic trends (see table 1). Albania and Georgia had the lowest per
capita income of the group, with incomes of US$4,320 and US$1,766 (2000
U.S. dollars, purchasing power parity), respectively, but they experienced strong
GDP growth during the two-year period studied as well as during the previous
three years. Russia and Ukraine had higher GDP per capita levels in the period
covered by the data. However, they also had quite different growth perform-
ances: Russia had very low growth, while Ukraine in the early part of the
century had a high rate of growth. Hungary and Poland are higher-income coun-
tries, but they also experienced very different patterns of growth. During the
period of study, Hungary underwent a major restructuring process, while Poland
had higher growth at the beginning of the century. 
The three Latin American countries experienced considerable volatility dur-
ing the period of study. From 1995 to 2002,Venezuela underwent an exceedingly
volatile period, experiencing major swings in growth from 10 percent per
annum growth between 1995 and 1998, to the sudden decline of about 10 per-
cent in 1999, to the subsequent recovery in 2001 by 8 percent, and the fall in
2002 of another 12 percent. At the same time, although it had the highest per
capita income among the countries, the period covered by the analysis
(1995–2001) was not stellar economically for Argentina. The severe economic
crisis officially began in 2001, which was preceded since 1998 by slow growth
and mounting debt. Average annual growth was less than 1 percent during the
period of study, although it had been 7.9 percent in the previous three years.
190 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
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Mexico also had its share of volatility during its period of study from 1990 to
2001. The peso crisis occurred in 1995, with GDP declining by 6 percent. How-
ever, this was followed by strong growth of 5 percent annually, such that the
period as a whole had an average growth rate of 3.2 percent. 
Openness in trade increased substantially in most countries during the period
of study. This was particularly true in eastern European countries, which with
the exception of Albania underwent rapid growth in trade as a percentage of
GDP. Trade openness also increased in Latin America, albeit to a lower extent.
The fastest growth was in Argentina, although from a low base of 16 percent
of GDP in 1995. 
Our data indicate that approximately one-third of the individuals are not par-
ticipating in the labor force, ranging from 29 percent in Albania to 41 percent
in Mexico. Unemployment—as a share of the working-age population—varies
significantly across the countries (about 3 percent of the working-aged in Mex-
ico but about 12 percent in Georgia and Poland). Formal-sector workers
constitute a large share of the population in Hungary but a much smaller per-
centage in Venezuela and Albania (21 percent and 14 percent, respectively). In
comparison with their formal-sector counterparts, informal wage earners com-
pose a much smaller share of the population in all countries—approximately
half the size of the share of formal employees in Argentina and Mexico and
even a smaller share in Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. The informal-
wage sector comes closest in size to the formal sector in Albania and Venezuela.
Self-employed workers in nonagricultural jobs represent 10 percent or less of
the population in all countries. However, in the countries for which informa-
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Table 1. Economic Indicators
GDP growth: Trade/GDP:
GDP growth: annual average 
GDP per annual percent annual 
Period capita percent change, change 
Country of study PPP a change prior 3 years (1995–2004)
Albania 2002–2004 4,320 5.1 8.3 –1.02
Argentina 1995–2001 12,091 0.9 7.9 9.85
Georgia 1998–99 1,766 3.0 8.1 10.18
Hungary 1993–97 10,450 1.9 –6.2 4.5
Mexico 1990–2001 8,613 3.2 2.3 0.84
Poland 2000–02 10,501 2.5 5.2 6.56
Russia 1994–2003 6,896 0.9 –9.4 3.30
Ukraine 2003–04 5,544 10.7 6.8 5.38
Venezuela 1995–2002 5,860 0.3 1.3 0.82
Source: World Bank (2006).
PPP = Purchasing power parity. 
a. Constant 2000 international dollars. 
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tion on self-employment in agricultural sectors is available (in Venezuela,Alba-
nia, Georgia, and Poland), the share of this group is between 15 and 30 percent
of the sample, except for Poland, which is at 10 percent.
Quite notably, in eastern European countries the transition to a market econ-
omy and the opening to the rest of the world have been accompanied by an
increase in informal salaried employment. Among the Latin American coun-
tries, the same trend is observed in Argentina. Contrary to these observed
increases, informal salaried employment as a proportion of the population
declined in Mexico and Venezuela. 
Labor Mobility 
We describe labor mobility by calculating conditional probabilities of find-
ing a worker in status j, in period t + k, conditional on being in status i at time
t, or 
pij = p(St+k = j/St = i)
for all labor statuses in the nine countries. This yields 6 by 6 transition matrices
for each country (or 5 by 5 if the category self-employed in agricultural activi-
ties is not available). 
When calculating transition probabilities, we obtain a number of interest-
ing results (see table 2):
—Unemployment is more persistent in the transition economies. The dif-
ferences in unemployment persistency are quite large. In Poland 67 percent of
the unemployed workers had a spell of joblessness longer than one year. That
figure is 50 percent in Georgia, around 39 percent in Hungary, but only 12 per-
cent in Mexico. Lower unemployment insurance payments and lower duration
of benefits in Latin America are likely to explain such differences. 
—Across countries, workers tend to stay in formal salaried jobs for longer
periods of time than they do in informal salaried jobs. In all countries work-
ers are much more likely to remain in a formal job than in an informal one,
with the highest differences being observed in Georgia and Hungary. This gap
is still present in Mexico, although it is much smaller, where formal and infor-
mal salary jobs seem to be more similar. Self-employment shows an intermediate
degree of persistence in all countries except in Russia. Self-employment activ-
ities in agriculture are more stable than are those in other economic sectors.
—Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, informal salaried workers are
more likely to end up unemployed than are formal salaried workers. The like-
192 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
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lihood that an employed worker will transit to unemployment is more than twice
as high for an informal wage employee than for the formal counterpart. Such
differences are more pronounced in Hungary, Poland, and Russia but less so
in Mexico, where, as indicated above, there seem to be few differences between
formal and informal salaried jobs. Instead, there are no common patterns among
the nine countries relative to the exit from unemployment to salaried jobs. In
Albania and Argentina unemployed workers are more than twice as likely to
find an informal salaried job relative to a salaried one; in Ukraine and Hungary
the tendency is the reverse. In the rest of the countries studied, transition prob-
abilities from unemployment to the two types of salaried work are of similar
magnitude. 
—Within employment, mobility between salaried jobs is much higher than
mobility between salaried jobs and self-employment. Thus it is quite remark-
able that with the exception of Albania the probability of moving from an
informal salaried job to a formal one is higher than the probabilities of mov-
ing to unemployment, self-employment, or out of the labor market. Of course,
this only reflects transitions between one year and the year after. Workers may
have spent some intermediate time in unemployment or other states, but we are
unable to observe this. It is quite interesting, however, that moving to self-
employment from informal salaried jobs is less prevalent than is moving to
formal sector jobs. Strong preference for formal jobs, relative to self-
employment; cumbersome procedures and regulations to starting new firms;
or lack of access to capital may explain why many workers who are displaced
or quit informal jobs end up in formal salaried employment. 
Similarly, workers who exit formal salaried jobs are in all cases much more
likely to move to an informal salaried job than to self-employment, suggesting
again that preferences for salaried jobs, hurdles to firm creation such as admin-
istrative and legal procedures to register a business, or limited access to capital
may limit entry into self-employment. But it is also noticeable that in countries
with well-established safety nets (such as Poland and Hungary) workers are more
likely to move to unemployment rather than to an informal salaried job. 
What about mobility out of self-employment? The results here are quite
diverse. In three out of the nine countries (Albania, Argentina, Ukraine), work-
ers who exit self-employment are more likely to end up in an informal salaried
job than in any other status. In Hungary and Russia they are more likely to
move to a formal salaried job, while in Poland they are more likely to go to
unemployment than to any other destination. In Mexico and Venezuela they
are more likely to exit the labor force, followed soon after by moving to informal
salaried jobs. In Georgia, workers who exit self-employment in nonagricul-
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tural activities are more likely to become self-employed in agricultural activi-
ties (that is, they become farmers). However, it is quite noticeable that in all
countries with the exception of Russia the probability of moving to a formal
salaried job is much higher for workers who exit informal salaried activities
than it is for workers who exit self-employment. 
In addition to transition probabilities, one can compute additional measures
that make use of the trace or determinant of such matrices to assess aggregate
mobility—that is, which country displays the higher rate of mobility across all
labor market statuses. We found that despite the deep restructuring process that
took place in the transition economies during the past decade, aggregate labor
mobility is lower in these countries, compared with that in the three Latin Amer-
ican countries.9 Mexico and Venezuela are the countries that experience higher
aggregate mobility, while at the other extreme Poland and Georgia exhibit the
lowest.10 Part of the explanation for this regional difference is due to the large
mobility out of unemployment and movement in and out of the labor market
in Latin America (particularly in Mexico and Venezuela) compared with the
transition economies. This is due to different factors. First, there is a high
mobility in and out of the labor market by youth. For example, the probability
of moving from unemployment to out of the labor force among youth is around
30 percent in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela.11 Second, mobility in and out
of jobs—even in the formal sector—is higher in Latin America compared with
transition economies.12 Third, higher macroeconomic volatility in Latin Amer-
ica may further explain such regional differences. 
These results for aggregate mobility refer to the average worker. While
aggregate mobility is higher for youth (aged 15 to 24) than it is for the prime-
age population (25 to 49), the latter also experiences substantial mobility.13 For
example, the probability of switching from a formal to an informal job is on
average 12 percent for youth and 7 percent for the prime-age population (table
3). But adults experience a higher probability of moving from an informal to
a formal job (24 percent compared with 19 percent for youth). By level of skill,
Pagés and Stampini report higher mobility between formal and informal salaried
jobs for unskilled workers relative to skilled ones.14
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9. See Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta (2006) for aggregate mobility results. 
10. These results do not include data for Russia. 
11. See Borgarello and others (2006). 
12. There is also high mobility from informal wage employment and inactivity (defined as out
of the labor market) among youth in Latin America and, albeit lower, between self-employment
and inactivity. See Borgarello and others (2006) for more details on youth mobility in the labor
market. 
13. Borgarello and others (2006). 
14. Pagés and Stampini (2006). 
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Wage Changes 
The results discussed above illustrate that workers undergo substantial labor
mobility, but is this mobility conducive to income gains? Or rather do workers
undergo important wage losses as they transit across labor market statuses? 
To assess the effects of a job switch on earnings, we compare the change in
earnings of workers who switch jobs with the change in earnings of those work-
ers who did not switch jobs. To prevent such comparisons from being affected
by differences in the characteristics of workers in different statuses, we also
control for such differences in observable characteristics, such that these observ-
able differences are not driving the wage changes.15 The results listed below
only address job-to-job transitions (including moving to self-employment)
since we do not observe earnings for unemployed or out-of-labor-force work-
ers. We therefore miss an important source of income instability associated with
the income losses that result from periods of being unemployed or out of the
labor force. In addition, results relative to earning changes cannot be obtained
for all countries and employment statuses because in some countries either earn-
ings for self-employed workers are not available or the number of workers
200 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
15. More formally, we estimate the following equation:
where Wm is hourly wage of individual m, Smi(t) represents the labor market status i of individual
m in period t, X is a vector of individual characteristics that are assumed to affect not only the sta-
tus in the labor market at any point in time but also the probability of moving across statuses in
the labor market, D represents time dummies, and εit is the iid error term. Individual and job char-
acteristics include age and age squared, education, occupation, and industry. From this, we predict
the change in wage from moving from status i to status j. Finally, we assess the following difference-
in-difference estimate: ΔΔw = Δwij – Δwii.
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Table 3. Transition Probabilities between Formal and Informal Salaried Jobs by Age
15–24-year-olds 25–49-year-olds
P(F,I)a P(I,F) P(F,I) P(I,F)
Argentina 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.15
Albania 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.16
Georgia 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.29
Mexico 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.28
Ukraine 0.08 0.44 0.03 0.3
Venezuela 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.25
Average 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.24
Source: Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta (2006).
a. P(F, I) denotes transition probability from labor market status formal salaried to status informal salaried. P(I,F) denotes transition
probability from informal to formal salaried. 
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observed transiting from one status to another is too small to make reliable esti-
mates of wage changes. Nonetheless, the available data yield a number of
insights:16
On average, Latin American workers who move from formal to informal
salaried jobs suffer a decline in wages (compared with workers who remain in
formal salaried jobs), while the evidence is more ambiguous in transition
economies. In Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela workers who move from for-
mal to informal salaried jobs experience a decline in monthly wages; the reverse
move results in an increase in wages. Similar results are found in Albania and
Ukraine. When switching from formal to informal salaried jobs in Georgia,
Poland, and Russia, workers experience an increase in monthly earnings (com-
pared with workers who stay in formal salaried jobs), indicating better
opportunities in the unregulated economy. 
However, large individual heterogeneity exists among workers moving from
formal to informal salaried jobs. Even in countries in which workers moving
from a formal to an informal salaried job register a decline in earnings on aver-
age, a substantial share of workers experience wage increases associated with
that change. For example, in Argentina 43 percent of the workers who move
from the formal to the informal sector experience a wage increase. The corre-
sponding numbers for Albania, Russia, Mexico, and Venezuela are 37, 35, 44,
and 35 percent, respectively.
Workers who switch from formal to informal jobs may be negatively selected.
In all countries, with the exception of Albania and Georgia, workers who remain
in formal salaried jobs have, on average, higher initial wages than workers who
move to informal salaried jobs. Significantly, the opposite is also the case for
workers who switch from informal to formal salaried jobs: in most countries,
the average starting wage of “switchers” (from the informal to formal sector)
is higher than the average starting wage of “stayers.” This is consistent with
lower observed or unobserved abilities for workers who switch to the informal
sector. This also indicates that traditional estimates of wage differentials between
formal- and informal-sector workers may be overestimated: an important com-
ponent of wage gaps between the formal and informal sector may be associated
with negative selection. 
The consequences for earnings of switching between formal salaried and
self-employed jobs vary across countries. In Mexico and Venezuela moving
from a formal salaried job to self-employment results, on average, in a decline
in monthly earnings (relative to those workers who remain in their original sta-
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16. See Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta (2006) for further description of the method-
ology and a full description of the results relative to wage changes. 
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tus), while the opposite move brings an increase. In Argentina switching from
formal salaried employment to self-employment is associated with an increase
in monthly earnings. However, moving from self-employment to a formal
salaried job is also associated with higher monthly earnings, indicating that
workers move when they see opportunities for improvement. 
There are also indications of negative selection among those who move from
formal salaried jobs to self-employment: Workers who make this shift have
lower starting salaries on average than do workers who remain in formal salaried
jobs. And when moving from self-employment to a full salaried job, those work-
ers have, on average, higher starting wages than workers who remain in
self-employment.
Workers who move from informal salaried jobs to self-employment experi-
ence an increase in earnings. In the few countries for which a sufficient number
of observations are available for transitions from salaried informal jobs to self-
employment, the evidence suggests that such a move leads to an increase in
monthly earnings. The opposite transition tends to lead to a decline in earn-
ings, but not in all cases. In Albania and Argentina a move from self-employment
to a salaried informal job is associated with an increase in monthly earnings,
suggesting again that workers move when opportunities for improvement are
available. 
There is evidence that those who move from salaried informal jobs to self-
employment are positively selected: the starting earnings of workers who remain
in salaried informal jobs are lower than the starting earnings of workers who
move to self-employment. Conversely, workers who switch from self-
employment to salaried informal jobs had lower starting earnings (when
self-employed) than those who remain in self-employment. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the analysis suggests a complex picture of workers’ mobility in the
labor market. Mobility is quite high not only in and out of the labor market but
also across different types of jobs. Contrary to what is commonly found, infor-
mal salaried workers are more likely to transit to unemployment than are formal
salaried workers. This is at least partly explained by the much lower stability
of informal salaried jobs, relative to formal salaried employment. Within jobs,
mobility within wage employment (that is, formal to informal) is higher than
that between wage employment and self-employment, suggesting that barriers
to entry into self-employment or strong preferences for salaried employment
202 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
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reduce flows into self-employment. For workers who leave self-employment,
transitions to informal salaried jobs, unemployment, or exiting the labor force
entirely tend to be more common than moving into a formal salaried job.
The data also suggest important earning consequences of transitions. In
some countries, there is evidence that, on average, workers who move from
formal to informal salaried employment experience earning losses. Yet in some
of the transition economies, switching from formal to informal salaried jobs
improves workers’earnings. Similarly, for many, switching to self-employment
is a way to improve earnings, particularly for informal wage workers. Within
countries, there is significant individual heterogeneity in earnings changes asso-
ciated with mobility: Even when workers lose earnings from switching across
certain statuses on average, many workers gain in that process. Finally, there
is evidence of selection among switchers: The data suggest that those who switch
from formal to informal salaried activities are negatively selected, while those
who move to self-employment from informal salaried activities are positively
selected.
Duryea, Marquéz, Pagés, and Scarpetta 203
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Comment
and Discussion 
Carmen Reinhart: I will offer three areas of comment on the paper. The first
concerns the macroeconomic environment in which the transitions discussed take
place. Second, I want to focus on the methodology employed and suggest some
directions where the authors might develop some interesting insights by further
parsing the data. Finally, I have a few reservations concerning the quality of the
data.
The paper reviews evidence on labor market mobility in nine countries. Three
countries (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) come from Latin America, while
the remainder (Albania, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine)
are transition economies in Eastern Europe. The period of study ranges from
as little as two years (Georgia and the Ukraine) to eleven years (Mexico). The
paper uses longitudinal labor force survey data to construct a transition matrix
for each country, with each cell representing the probability of having labor
force status j in period t + k conditional on having status i in period t. The authors
consider six possible labor force outcomes (an issue I will return to later): out
of the labor force, unemployed, formal salaried worker, informal salaried
worker, self-employed, and farmer.
As a macroeconomist, I tend to think about the big picture when viewing
issues of labor mobility. Table 1 in the paper and the subsequent discussion high-
lights the high level of macrovolatility in the countries studied. Many of the
countries experienced large output swings during the sample period, and in oth-
ers (Hungary and Russia) the period of analysis immediately followed a severe
recession. I would additionally emphasize that other types of volatility, such as
relative price movements between the traded and nontraded sector, can have
important influences on labor market options beyond their effect on output. 
Economic crises serve to highlight the effects of the kinds of macroeconomic
volatility I have in mind. The sample includes episodes of currency, banking,
debt, and inflation crises, so consideration of crisis dynamics is nontrivial. As
204
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an example, currency crises imply large changes in the real exchange rate, which
can have a particularly adverse effect on the nontraded sector. If, say, a cur-
rency crisis precedes the collapse of the real estate and construction industries,
we would likely see a large movement of the displaced workers from the for-
mal to the informal sector. The authors should control for such macroeconomic
effects in their analysis, and they might generate some useful observations by
examining in detail certain crisis subperiods.1
My second suggestion involves looking more closely within the labor mar-
ket movements reported. I again come back to big picture economic currents,
here financial liberalization and privatization, which were prominent in all of
the countries in the sample. I would like to see the authors expand their matrix
to make it possible to study movements within a given labor market sector that
could shed light on the effects of these big picture policies.
Financial liberalization has had a profound impact on the structure of the
economies considered. I recall traveling in Indonesia in 1995, when overnight
it seemed the country went from five banks to one hundred and five banks.
Financial liberalization likely played an especially important role in the for-
mer Soviet states. As a result, a significant portion of these economies shifted
from agriculture or manufacturing into finance. It would constitute a major con-
tribution to document how the associated reallocation of resources affected labor
market mobility. Importantly, this would require looking within the formal
salaried sector to measure movement into financial firms.
The period of study also coincided with substantial privatizing of state-
owned enterprises. Such privatizations occurred in all of the transition
economies, as well as in Mexico and Argentina. A common feature of these
privatizations was subsequent downsizing—newly private firms laying off sur-
plus labor. I would like to know the extent to which transitions out of the formal
salaried sector can be related to firms’ privatizing. In Argentina, for example,
privatization has been associated with rising macro-unemployment. Does this
relationship hold at the microlevel, and how many of the laid-off workers wind
up taking jobs in the informal sector? Note again that these questions require
looking within a given cell of the matrix, in this case to focus on the transition
probabilities for formal sector workers in formerly government companies.
Finally, a few points of reservation. The first concerns the quality of the data,
particularly for the informal sector. The authors could do more to convince the
reader that measurement errors are not systematic and therefore driving the
results. Second, I advise caution when comparing Latin American countries to
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1. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Frankel and Rose (1996) contain dates of currency crises,
and Caprio and others (2005) list banking crises. 
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those in Eastern Europe. The period of study coincides with the transition from
a centrally planned economy in the former Soviet states, which must have influ-
enced flows between the formal and informal sector. Any conclusions regarding
the disparate effects of labor market institutions in these two regions should be
considered in this light. 
I enjoyed this paper and learned much from it. I urge the authors to take
greater consideration of the macroeconomic circumstances, particularly the
implications of choosing a sample of countries prone to frequent crises. I also
hope they pay more attention to transitions within sectors, as examining flows
within the formal sector and from certain industries and types of firms may
yield many fruitful insights. 
Discussion: Susan Collins began by noting the rich nature of the findings on
mobility. She suggested the possibility of probing the data sets for information
about cross-border migration, in addition to internal migration, as a relevant
extension of the research. 
Carol Graham suggested that an analogue to Carmen Reinhart’s focus on
the macroeconomic picture, which was triggered by the high degree of vari-
ance in unemployment rates, would be an additional focus on social welfare
institutions. She noted that cross-country differences in the extent of social sup-
port might help explain this variance in rates. In some contexts, such as in Latin
America, where social welfare systems are much more limited than they are in
Poland (which has the highest unemployment rates of any country in the data
set), most individuals cannot afford to be formally unemployed and instead are
self-employed or in the informal sector. 
John McHale noted that the results in the paper shed new light on what it
means to be formal and informal and how that meaning varies across coun-
tries. The paper provides a better sense of how wages vary across these sectors
and in unexpected ways. In Eastern Europe, for example, wages are not that
different in the informal sector. These very modest differences imply some-
thing very different about the structure of the economy and what that
formal-informal distinction means as compared with a case in which there are
very sharp distinctions in wages. 
Lant Pritchett suggested that the paper should have made distinctions between
the transition matrices of men and women from the outset. He noted that the
behavior of men and women in the labor force behavior was very different and
thus pooling it in the same transition matrix may make little sense. In the same
vein, he felt that young, prime-age, and old workers should also be separated.
If eighteen-year-olds, for example, churn through six jobs, it is not particularly
206 Brookings Trade Forum: 2006
duryea-pages  2/13/07  9:24 AM  Page 206
worrisome. Those same trends for a prime-age worker would be extremely
unsettling. 
Carmen Pagés responded by saying that she appreciated the comments and
acknowledging that the paper was preliminary and very much part of ongoing
research. She and her coauthors still have a great deal of data to analyze, and
they are trying to organize it according to a model that will enable them to
account for many of the issues raised by the commentators. She also agreed
with Carmen Reinhart on the importance of going beyond the microlevel and
looking at macro trends. 
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